Abstract
The paper analyzes the relationship between CO2 mitigation policy and promotion policies designed to deploy renewable energy sources for electricity production (RES-E). If an emission cap is the only policy target, an optimal mix consisting of high and low carbon use of fossil fuels, deployment of RES-E, and energy savings can best be achieved by either setting a uniform carbon tax or by implementing a cap-and-trade system covering all CO2 sources. An additional RES-E share target causes higher costs in achieving the cap. Conversely, a more ambitious emission target automatically increases the RES-E share. In a second step, we investigate different policies for inducing an RES-E quota. Such a quota can be efficiently achieved either by a system of tradable green certificates, budget-balanced FIT system, or budget-balancing premium system. We also show that differentiated, technology-specific FITs are not efficient.
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Notes
For details, see Selin and VanDeever (2009).
In Germany, the FIT mark-up was 3.59€ cents per kwh in 2012. By 2014 the mark-up increases by 47 % to 6.27€ cents per kwh. (http://www.bmwi.de). If the still low share of off-shore wind power capacity is further increased, an additional sharp increase in the mark-up is likely to occur.
An institutional setting of this kind is used in Germany, for example. It is also possible to pay a tariff in addition to the market price (premium model), as is the case in Spain. In the absence of uncertainty, these two regimes are equivalent. The premium naturally differs in size from the FIT.
According to Savin et al. (2012), 65 countries world-wide use FITs, while 18 countries (53 jurisdictions) use quotas or renewable portfolio standards, the less efficient version of a tradable quota system.
Introduction to DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC (EC (2009)), paragraph (1).
Ibid. paragraph (3).
Ibid., paragraph (4).
Here, we observe a 200 % real price increase over the last 12 years (InvestmentMine (2013) and own calculations).
The share of oil in electricity production is 5 % worldwide and 3 % in the EU.
Especially magnets for modern wind turbines use large amounts of Nd. Batteries, catalytic converters, and other so-called environmental technologies often require up to a dozen different rare earth elements.
Detailed calculations of all values can be obtained from the author on request.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Christoph Böhringer, Mathis Klepper, Matthias Weitzel, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and Stacy VanDeveer for information on overlapping US carbon policies.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating (7)–(10) with respect to \(\bar{E}\), we can write the resulting equation system in matrix form (omitting the function arguments) as
Let \({\text{Det}}(M) = \left[ {\alpha_{\text{f}}^{2} C_{\text{b}}^{{\prime \prime }} + \alpha_{\text{b}}^{ 2} C_{f}^{{\prime \prime }} } \right]\left[ {C_{\text{r}}^{{\prime \prime }} - P^{{\prime }} } \right] - C_{\text{r}}^{{\prime \prime }} P^{{\prime }} \left[ {\alpha_{\text{b}} - \alpha_{\text{f}} } \right]^{2} > 0\) be the determinant of the matrix in (62). Solving (62), we obtain
While (64) is ambiguous as to the sign, we see immediately by adding (63) and (64) that
Finally, for the share of renewable energy we obtain
That the sign of \(\frac{{{\text{d}}Q_{\text{f}} }}{{{\text{d}}\bar{E}}}\) is indeed ambiguous can be shown by example. Choose \(P(Q) = A - BQ\) and \(C_{i} (Q_{i} ) = \frac{{c_{i} }}{2}Q_{i}^{2}\) and let A = 100.0, B = 1.0, c b = 0.1, c f = 0.3, c r = 1.0, α b = 1.0, α f = 0.5. If we now tighten the emission cap from \(\bar{E} = 50\) to \(\bar{E} = 40\), we will find that Q f increases from 16.67 to 37.78. If we choose c f = 0.9, keeping all other parameters as before and tightening the emission cap from \(\bar{E} = 50\) to \(\bar{E} = 40\), we will find that Q f decreases from 18.13 to 17.10.Footnote 14
Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating (12)–(14) with respect to ζ yields in matrix form
Let \({\text{Det}}(M) = C_{\text{r}}^{{\prime \prime }} \left[ {C_{\text{b}}^{{\prime \prime }} C_{\text{r}}^{{\prime \prime }} - P^{{\prime }} (C_{\text{b}}^{{\prime \prime }} + C_{\text{f}}^{{\prime \prime }} )} \right] > 0\) be the determinant of the matrix in (69). Solving this equation, we obtain
From this we derive, after simplification,
Proof of Proposition 4
Differentiating (17)–(20) with respect to \(\zeta\) yields in matrix form
By stability of the competitive equilibrium the determinant of the matrix \({\text{Det}}(M) = C_{\text{r}}^{{\prime \prime }} \left[ {\left[ {C_{\text{f}}^{{\prime \prime }} + C_{\text{b}}^{{\prime \prime }} } \right]\left[ { - P^{{\prime }} \; \times \;Q - t} \right] + C_{\text{f}}^{{\prime \prime }} C_{\text{b}}^{{\prime \prime }} \left[ {Q_{\text{b}} + Q_{\text{f}} } \right]} \right]\) must be positive. Solving (75), we obtain
To show that the sign of \({\text{d}}Q/{\text{d}}\zeta\) is ambiguous, we again choose linear (inverse) demand \(P(Q) = A - BQ\) and cost functions of the type \(C_{j} (q) = c_{j0} q + c_{j1} q^{2} /2\) for j = b, f, r. Parameters are selected according to A = 100.0, B = 1.0, \(c_{b0} = 0.1\), \(c_{b1} = 0.1\), \(c_{f0} = 0.2\), \(c_{f1} = 0.3\), \(c_{r0} = 1.0\), \(c_{r1} = 0.05\).
Then for ζ = 8 (ζ = 10, ζ = 12) we obtain Q = 380 (Q = 385, ζ = 380).
Proof of Proposition 6
By differentiating (26)–(29) with respect to β we can write the resulting equation system in matrix form (omitting the function arguments) as
Writing the determinant of the matrix in (82) as \({\text{Det}}[M] = - C_{\text{b}}^{{\prime \prime }} C_{\text{f}}^{{\prime \prime }} [1 - \beta ]^{2} + \beta^{2} [C_{\text{b}}^{{\prime \prime }} + C_{\text{f}}^{{\prime \prime }} ][P^{{\prime }} - C_{\text{r}}^{{\prime \prime }} ] < 0\) for short and solving (82), we obtain
To show the ambiguity of \(\frac{{{\text{d}}Q_{\text{r}} }}{{{\text{d}}\beta }}\), \(\frac{{{\text{d}}\mu }}{{{\text{d}}\beta }}\), and \(\frac{{{\text{d}}Q}}{{{\text{d}}\beta }}\) we take the functional forms as in the proof of Proposition 2 and choose A = 100.0, B = 1.0, \(c_{b} = 0.1\), \(c_{f} = 0.3\), \(c_{r} = 1.0\). Increasing \(\beta\) leads to strictly increasing Q r, decreasing total output and increasing shadow cost of the RES-E. Taking a less elastic inverse demand function by selecting B = 0.2, we can show Q r and the shadow cost μ to be inverted U-shaped. Choosing B = 1.5, we can see that for small but binding β, total output is first increasing then decreasing when β is increased.
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Requate, T. Green tradable certificates versus feed-in tariffs in the promotion of renewable energy shares. Environ Econ Policy Stud 17, 211–239 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-014-0096-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-014-0096-8